Sexual Violence Directed Against Men and Boys in Armed Conflict or Mass Atrocity: Addressing a Gendered Harm in International Criminal Tribunals by Oosterveld, Valerie
Western University
Scholarship@Western
Law Publications Law School
2014
Sexual Violence Directed Against Men and Boys in
Armed Conflict or Mass Atrocity: Addressing a
Gendered Harm in International Criminal
Tribunals
Valerie Oosterveld
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/lawpub
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, International Law Commons, Law and Gender
Commons, Military, War, and Peace Commons, and the Sexuality and the Law Commons
Citation of this paper:
Oosterveld, Valerie, "Sexual Violence Directed Against Men and Boys in Armed Conflict or Mass Atrocity: Addressing a Gendered
Harm in International Criminal Tribunals" (2014). Law Publications. 109.
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/lawpub/109
 !"#$%&"'()*+,-"(."/+01*+,02(+,-"3,4",+5"/+01*+,02(+,-"61-,02(+7"
8(-"%$9":,;17"%$<=%#>?""/@@AB"%<%#=#C>>?"
!"#$%&'()*&"+,"'-).",/"0'12%)+3/'4"+'%+0'5*63')+'
1.7"0'8*+9&),/'*.'4%33'1/.*,)/6:''
100."33)+2'%';"+0"."0'<%.7')+'=+/".+%/)*+%&'8.)7)+%&'
>.)?$+%&3'
VALERIE OOSTERVELD* 
I. !"#$%&'(#!%")********************************************************************************************************)+,-)
II. $.(%/"!#!%")01)!"#.$"2#!%"23)($!4!"23)#$!0'"235)%6)423.7#2$/.#.&)5.8'23)9!%3."(.)***************************************************)++,)
III. !"#.$"2#!%"23)($!4!"23)32:)2"&)#;.)62(#'23)/2<))%")5.8'23)9!%3."(.)&!$.(#.&)2/2!"5#)4.")2"&)0%15)***********)++=)
IV. !"#.$"2#!%"23)($!4!"23)32:)2"&)#;.)5%(!23)/2<)%")5.8'23)9!%3."(.)&!$.(#.&)2/2!"5#)4.")2"&)0%15)***********)++>)
V. !"#.$"2#!%"23)($!4!"23)32:)2"&)3./23)/2<5)%")5.8'23)9!%3."(.)&!$.(#.&)2/2!"5#)4.")2"&)0%15)***********)+?,)
VI. (%"(3'5!%")*************************************************************************************************************)+?@)
 
I. Introduction 
Men and boys are targeted for sexual violence during armed conflict or 
other forms of mass atrocity, but this fact has received relatively little 
attention within the international community.1 The recent conflicts taking 
place in Syria and Libya provide stark illustrations of sexual violence 
directed against males. For example, the February 2013 report of the United 
Nations (UN)-appointed Independent International Commission of Inquiry 
on Syria examined numerous reports of sexual violence taking place during 
                                                
* Associate Professor, University of Western Ontario Faculty of Law. I wish to thank Alexandra 
MacKenzie for her superb research assistance, Prof. Margaret Martin for her helpful comments, 
and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for funding my research. 
Any errors are my own. 
1 Sandesh Sivakumaran, “Prosecuting Sexual Violence Against Men and Boys” in Anne-Marie 
de Brouwer et al, eds, Sexual Violence as an International Crime: Interdisciplinary Approaches 
(Antwerp: Intersentia, 2013) 79 at 79, 93 [Sivakumaran, “Prosecuting”].  
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during the Syrian conflict in two distinct contexts: against women by 
government forces and affiliated militia during house searches and at 
checkpoints; and against men, boys, women and girls in detention centres as 
a means to extract information, humiliate and punish.3 Men and boys in 
detention have been raped, and had their genitals electrocuted with live 
wires or burned by cigarettes, lighters or melted plastic.4 As well, 
government forces used sexual violence as a method of coercion, by 
detaining and raping (or threatening to rape) male and female family 
members to force male relatives fighting with opposition armed groups to 
surrender themselves.5 The UN-appointed International Commission of 
Inquiry on Libya highlighted similar stories.6 Male and female victims were 
subjected to sexual violence by Qadhafi forces in detention centres to extract 
information about the opposition, humiliate and punish.7 As in Syria, the 
forms of male sexual violence included anal rape, rape with an instrument, 
electrocution of genitals and burning of genitals.8 These examples highlight 
the need for more focus within international criminal law on male-targeted 
sexual violence.9 
This article explores the current state of understanding within 
international criminal law of sexual violence directed at men and boys, 
particularly as a crime against humanity or a war crime. It begins by 
examining how international criminal tribunals have approached male-
targeted sexual violence to date, concluding that the tribunals have been 
uneven in their approach; even so, these cases have been helpful in creating 
the beginnings of a typology of male sexual violence. The article then turns 
to identifying three main gaps that must be addressed in order to improve 
the ability of international criminal tribunals – and, similarly, domestic 
courts prosecuting international crimes - to address this form of sexual 
violence.10 The first gap is an information gap: there is a dearth of systematic 
data on sexual violence directed against men and boys in armed conflict or 
atrocity. The result is that relatively little is known about the prevalence, 
patterns and effects of male sexual violence, and less attention is paid to the 
issue than should be the case, including in the field of international criminal 
law. The second gap can be referred to as a social gap. Men and boys may 
not feel able to speak about their experiences or, if they do, they may not 
describe themselves as victims of sexual violence. In addition, international 
                                                
3 Ibid, at paras 106, 108, Annex IX paras 5, 10, 15, Annex X para 13. 
4 Ibid, at para 107 and Annex IX paras 5, 10-13. 
5 Ibid, at para 107 and Annex IX paras 5, 11. 
6 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya, 
UNHRCOR, 19th Sess, UN Doc A/HRC/19/68, (2012) at paras 65-70 [Libya Commission of 
Inquiry Report]. 
7 Ibid, at para 67. 
8 Ibid. 
9 This focus should not occur at the expense of attention to female-targeted sexual violence. 
Rather, it should occur in addition to an examination of sexual violence against women and 
girls, especially given the interrelationship between male- and female-targeted sexual violence: 
see Parts 2 and 4, below. 
10 While this article focuses on international criminal courts and tribunals, it is important to 
recognize that the same concerns and recommendations may also arise in domestic prosecutions 
of international crimes. 
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investigators, prosecutors, counsel (whether for victims or defence) and 
judges may have difficulty in recognizing sexual violence directed against 
men, whether due to certain, perhaps unconscious, assumptions that only 
women and girls are the victims of sexual violence; lack of training (of 
themselves or of the individuals they speak to or who serve as witnesses); or 
assumptions that certain violence, like forced circumcision, castration, penile 
amputation or sexual mutilation, is best categorized more generically as 
torture, inhumane acts or cruel treatment. The third gap is a legal gap, which 
is twofold: a gap in overt recognition and a gap in classification. While rape 
has been defined in international criminal law in a gender-neutral way,11 
there are other acts of sexual violence visited upon men and boys that are not 
explicitly named. This lack of overt recognition can be problematic because 
these acts must be prosecuted under other (broader, less descriptive) 
headings. When combined with the social gap, the result can be 
miscategorization. Sexual violence crimes directed at men and boys have 
been legally (re)classified as torture, cruel treatment or inhumane acts, 
thereby obscuring the sexual aspects of the harm done to the victims.  
A solid understanding of sexual violence directed against men and boys 
is crucial for international criminal law. Under the principle of legality,12 it is 
important to clarify the contours of this type of sexual violence so that it can 
be clearly labeled as a crime.13 As well, a deeper understanding of this form 
of sexual violence will help international criminal law’s understanding of all 
forms of sexual violence, including sexual violence directed against women 
and girls. Sexual violence directed at men and boys is often intertwined with 
sexual violence committed against women and girls and is intimately linked 
to socially-constructed gender norms. In the context of international criminal 
law, increased attention to sexual violence targeted at men and boys will 
lead to more accurate explanations by prosecutors of the depth of 
victimization of individuals and communities. Therefore, this article ends by 
                                                
11 See, e.g. the definition in the International Criminal Court’s Elements of Crimes document: 
International Criminal Court, Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal 
Court, Addendum, Part II, Finalized Draft Text of the Elements of Crimes, UN Doc 
PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (2000) at arts 7(1)(g)-1, 8(2)(b)(xxii)-1, 8(2)(e)(vi)-1 [ICC “Elements of 
Crimes”].  
12 Under the principle of legality (nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege), criminal conduct must 
have been laid down as clearly as possible in a written or unwritten form before the crime was 
committed: Gerhard Werle, “General Principles of International Criminal Law” in Antonio 
Cassese, ed, The Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2009) 54 at 55. 
13 This is exactly what has been happening over the past two decades with sexual and gender-
based violence directed against women and girls. Like sexual violence targeted at males, sexual 
violence directed at females was largely overlooked or ignored for centuries: Radhika 
Coomaraswamy, “Sexual Violence During Wartime” in Helen Durham and Tracey Gurd, eds, 
Listening to the Silences: Women and War (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005) 53 at 53. 
Labeling something as a violation of the law is an important expressive tool for revealing 
otherwise hidden harm: Rebecca J Cook and Simone Cusack, Gender Stereotyping: Transnational 
Legal Perspectives (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010) at 39. Note that 
international criminal law does not yet have a standardized definition of rape, which may pose a 
challenge to clearly labeling rape (whether of men, boys, women or girls) as a crime in certain 
circumstances as different definitions are more, or less, inclusive: see, e.g. Valerie Oosterveld, 
“Gender and the Charles Taylor Case at the Special Court for Sierra Leone” (2012) 19:1 William & 
Mary Journal of Women and the Law, 7 at 12-13.   
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discussing what needs to be done in order to translate what is known about 
sexual violence targeted against men and boys into successful international 
prosecutions.  
II. Recognition by International Criminal Tribunals of 
Male-Targeted Sexual Violence 
Sexual violence directed against men and boys in armed conflict and 
other forms of mass atrocity has rarely been prosecuted in international 
courts and tribunals, but there is some case law providing a helpful basis for 
future prosecutions. Much of this case law stems from the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), namely from cases 
dealing with events at detention facilities.14 The ICTY recorded in evidence 
various types of male sexual violence such as anal rape with objects,15 forced 
fellatio between detainees (including in front of other detainees),16 forced 
fellatio of a detainee on an accused,17 beatings on genitals,18 and placing a lit 
fuse around the genitals of a detainee.19 The International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR), the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone also contributed some – albeit less than the ICTY - 
supportive jurisprudence. The usefulness of the legal discussion varies, 
however, because these tribunals have been very inconsistent in their 
consideration of male sexual violence.20 This lack of consistency suggests 
there has been, or there is currently, no overarching or coherent prosecutorial 
policy, or consistent judicial analysis, on how to approach this form of sexual 
violence.  
The first inconsistency occurs in the charging – or failure to charge – rape 
and other forms of sexual violence against men and boys as such. Rape is the 
only form of sexual violence explicitly listed in each of the Statutes of the 
                                                
14 For a discussion on the ICTY’s statistics on the prosecution of male sexual violence, see Kirsten 
Campbell, “The Gender of Transitional Justice: Law, Sexual Violence and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia” (2007) 1 Int’l J Transitional Justice 411 at 422-427. 
15 Prosecutor v Blagoje Simić, IT-95-9-T, Judgment (17 October 2003) at para 728 (International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber II) [Simić Trial Judgment]. 
16 Ibid; Prosecutor v Momčilo Krajisnik, IT-00-39-T, Trial Judgment (27 September 2006) at para 304 
(International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber I) [Krajisnik Trial 
Judgment]. 
17 Simić Trial Judgment, supra note 15 at para 728. 
18 Ibid, at paras 695, 697, 698, 771; Prosecutor v Radoslav Br#anin, IT-99-36-T, Trial Judgment (1 
September 2004) para 498 (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial 
Chamber III) [Br#anin Trial Judgment]. 
19 Prosecutor v. Zdravko Mucić et al, IT-96-21-T, Trial Judgment (16 November 1998) paras 1035-
1040 (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber) [Mucić et al 
Trial Judgment]. 
20 Sivakumaran describes how the cases of the international criminal courts and tribunals tend to 
fall into three categories: (a) where sexual violence against men and boys is mentioned but not 
characterized as sexual violence; (b) where the sexual violence is mentioned and properly 
categorized as such but without any consequences attached to the violence; and (c) where the 
sexual violence is recognized as such and consequences (i.e. convictions) are attached to this 
violence: Sandesh Sivakumaran, “Lost in Translation: UN responses to sexual violence against 
men and boys in situations of armed conflict” (2010) 92:877 International Review of the Red 
Cross 259 at 272 [Sivakumaran, “Lost in Translation”].  
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ICTY, ICTR, ICC and Special Court for Sierra Leone.21 It is defined by these 
tribunals in a gender-neutral manner, and therefore captures male and 
female rape.22 The ICC has charged rape of men. In the Bemba case, involving 
acts committed in the Central African Republic, the confirmation of charges 
decision describes a man raped in succession by three soldiers in his house in 
the presence of his three wives and children.23 His two daughters were also 
raped in his presence.24 These incidents were charged as rape.25 Rape of men 
was also prosecuted as such at the ICTY.26 In Češić, the accused was 
convicted of rape for forcing two Muslim brothers to perform fellatio in front 
of the other prisoners.27 Conversely, in Mucić the ICTY prosecutor charged 
forced fellatio between two detained brothers as the grave breach of 
inhuman treatment and cruel treatment as a violation of the laws and 
customs of war.28 The Trial Chamber responded that this “act could 
constitute rape for which liability could have been found if pleaded in the 
appropriate manner”.29 Similarly, in the ICTY’s Simić case, anal rape of a 
male victim with a police truncheon, and forced oral sex between two male 
prisoners (as well as between a male prisoner and a perpetrator) was not 
considered specifically as rape, but more generally as “sexual assaults” 
                                                
21 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, UNSC Res 827, UNSCOR, 
48th Sess, UN Doc S/Res/827, (1993), art 5(g); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, UNSC Res 955, UNSCOR, 49th Sess, UN Doc S/Res/955, (1994), arts 3(g) and 4(e); Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc A/CONF 183/9, (1998), arts 7(1)(g), 
8(2)(b)(xxii), 8(2)(e)(vi) [Rome Statute]; Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, annexed to the 
Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the 
Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, 16 January 2002, 2178 UNTS 138 (entered into 
force 12 April 2002), arts 2(g) and 3(e) [Special Court for Sierra Leone Statute]. 
22 See e.g. ICC “Elements of Crimes”, supra note 11 at arts 7(1)(g)-1, 8(2)(b)(xxii)-1, 8(2)(e)(vi)-1; 
Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment (2 September 1998) at para 598 
(International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Trial Chamber) [Akayesu Trial Judgment]; 
Prosecutor v Dragoljub Kunarac et al, IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Judgment (22 February 2001) at 
para 460 (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber II [Kunarac 
et al Trial Judgment], followed in Prosecutor v Alex Tamba Brima et al, SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment (20 
June 2007) at para 963 (Special Court for Sierra Leone, Trial Chamber II) [AFRC Trial Judgment]. 
23 Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) 
and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo 
(15 June 2009) at para 171 (International Criminal Court, Pre-Trial Chamber II) [Bemba 
Confirmation of Charges].  
24 Ibid, at para 172. 
25 Ibid, at para 159. See also Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08, Public 
Redacted Version of Amended Document Containing the Charges Filed on 30 March 2009 (30 
March 2009) at para 39 (International Criminal Court, Pre-Trial Chamber II). 
26 Campbell notes that the four counts of male rape charged as rape at the ICTY involve fellatio 
rather than anal penetration: Campbell, supra note 14 at 427. 
27 Prosecutor v Ranko Češić, IT-95-10/1-S, Sentencing Judgment (11 March 2004) at paras 13-14, 33 
(International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber I) [Češić Trial 
Judgment]. See also Prosecutor v Stevan Todorovic, IT-95-9/1-S, Sentencing Judgment (31 July 
2001) paras 39-40 (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber) 
[Todorovic Sentencing Judgment]. See also Sivakumaran, “Lost in Translation”, supra note 20 at 
275. 
28 Mucić et al Trial Judgment, supra note 19 at para 1060. See also Todorovic Sentencing Judgment, 
supra note 27 at paras 17, 39-40, 66 (sexual assault as persecution). See also Sivakumaran, “Lost 
in Translation”, supra note 20 at 275. 
29 Mucić et al Trial Judgment, supra note 19 at para 1066. 
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amounting to torture and persecution.30 As well, in Krajisnik, the ICTY Trial 
Chamber found that Muslim and Croat male detainees were repeatedly 
“forced to engage in degrading sexual acts with each other in the presence of 
other detainees”.31 This was classified as inhumane treatment under the 
crime against humanity of persecution.32 The better approach is to charge 
rape as rape, in addition to other forms of harm (if the rape also fulfills the 
elements of crime for those other forms). When rape is categorized solely 
under non-rape categories, the sexual nature of the harm is obscured and 
therefore potentially lost when determining liability. As Erikkson 
convincingly notes, it is important to understand rape as a sexual 
manifestation of aggression because this leads to greater acknowledgement 
of the modes used to subjugate an enemy group in armed conflict or other 
forms of atrocity.33  
Prosecutors within international criminal courts and tribunals sometimes 
fail to charge male sexual violence (other than rape) at all. For example, in 
Br#anin, the ICTY Trial Chamber considered evidence of an elderly man 
being forced under threat to rape a female detainee at Omarska camp, but 
only considered that this was a violation against the female detainee.34 This 
can be contrasted with the Special Court for Sierra Leone, which considered 
such acts as violations against both of the victims.35 Another example comes 
from the Special Court for Sierra Leone, where the Prosecutor restricted the 
indictments against the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) leaders, and Charles Taylor (former 
President of Liberia), to sexual violence directed against “civilian women 
and girls”.36 Evidence of sexual violence directed against men and boys arose 
during the trials in all three cases, but the Trial Chamber in the AFRC and 
Taylor cases felt constrained by the indictment to attach no consequences to 
the evidence.37 In contrast, the Trial Chamber in the RUF case felt that the 
defect in the indictment had been cured and considered evidence of forced 
rape between male and female civilian captives, slicing of the sexual organs 
of male and female captives, forced male nudity, and the harm inherent in 
                                                
30 Simić Trial Judgment, supra note 15 at paras 728, 772. 
31 Krajisnik Trial Judgment, supra note 16 at paras 304, 800.  
32 Ibid, at paras 745, 1126. 
33 Maria Eriksson, Defining Rape: Emerging Obligations for States Under International Law? (Boston: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011) at 58. 
34 Br#anin Trial Judgment, supra note 18 at para 516.  
35 Prosecutor v Issa Hassan Sesay et al, SCSL-04-15-T, Judgment (2 March 2009) at paras 1205, 1207-
8 (Special Court for Sierra Leone, Trial Chamber I) [RUF Trial Judgment].  
36 Prosecutor v Alex Tamba Brima et al, SCSL-04-16-PT, Further Amended Consolidated Indictment 
(18 February 2005) at paras 51-57 (Special Court for Sierra Leone); Prosecutor v Issa Hassan Sesay 
et al, SCSL-04-15-PT, Corrected Amended Consolidated Indictment (2 August 2006) at paras 54-
60 (Special Court for Sierra Leone); Prosecutor v Charles Taylor, SCSL-03-01-PT, Prosecution’s 
Second Amended Indictment (29 May 2007) at paras 14-17 (Special Court for Sierra Leone). 
37 AFRC Trial Judgment, supra note 22 at paras 968-969; Prosecutor v Charles Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T, 
Judgment (18 May 2012) at paras 124-134 (Special Court for Sierra Leone, Trial Chamber II) 
[Taylor Trial Judgment]. Similarly, in Bagosora, the court heard evidence that amputated genitals 
of men were seen at roadblocks, but this was only considered as background information as the 
indictment contained no charges related to this: Prosecutor v. Théoneste Bagosora, ICTR-98-41-T, 
Judgment and Sentence (18 December 2008) at para 1908 (International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, Trial Chamber I). See also Sivakumaran, “Lost in Translation”, supra note 20 at 274. 
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forcing a husband to watch the rape and subsequent death of his wife.38 In a 
somewhat different iteration, sometimes judges do not seize the opportunity 
presented to highlight particular acts as sexual violence. For example, the 
ICTR heard evidence in Muhimana that a particular victim’s genitals were 
amputated and hung on a pole, but the Trial Chamber ignored this aspect of 
the victim’s death and concentrated on his shooting and subsequent 
beheading in the context of his murder.39 
Related to this issue, prosecutors within international criminal courts 
and tribunals sometimes fail to charge male sexual violence (other than rape) 
as such. There are a number of explanations,40 but the fact that only the 
Statutes of the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the ICC contain explicit 
reference to forms of sexual violence other than rape, such as sexual slavery, 
enforced prostitution, and “any other form of sexual violence” as a residual 
category,41 is a significant legal issue. Thus, the ICTY and ICTR Prosecutors 
were required to slot this evidence under other categories – usually the crime 
against humanity or war crime of torture, the crime against humanity of 
inhumane treatment or the war crime of cruel treatment.42 While recognizing 
that this has undoubtedly constrained the ICTY and ICTR, the prosecution 
and judges still had room to manoeuvre, in that they could describe how 
these seemingly non-sexual prohibited acts were committed in a sexual 
manner. However, the tribunals have been unpredictable in terms of 
whether and how they explain the sexual nature of the acts. For example, in 
the ICTY’s Simić case, a victim was beaten in the crotch and told “Muslims 
should not propagate”.43 Another was kicked in the genital area.44 This was 
referred to under the heading of “beatings, torture, forced labour and 
confinement under inhumane conditions” and was not referred to as sexual 
violence.45 Rather, it was categorized as cruel and inhumane treatment as an 
underlying act of persecution.46 In Mucić, the ICTY Trial Chamber 
characterized the placing of a lit fuse around the genitals of a male detainee 
as “physical mistreatment”47 and as causing “serious pain and injury”48 
qualifying as cruel treatment and wilfully causing great suffering and injury, 
but not as sexual violence.49 In a recent example, the ICTY Trial Chamber, in 
Stanišić and Župljanin, considered sexual violence directed against Muslim 
men, including sexual humiliation; the stomping of genitals; forced nudity; 
                                                
38 RUF Trial Judgment, supra note 35 at paras 1304, 1308, 1194, 1207, 1208, 1210, 1307, 1067, 1347.  
39 Prosecutor v Mikaeli Muhimana, ICTR-95-1B-T, Judgment and Sentence (28 April 2005) paras 
442-444, 448 (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Trial Chamber III); Sivakumaran, 
“Lost in Translation”, supra note 20 at 274. 
40 Social assumptions will be examined in Part 3, below. 
41 Special Court for Sierra Leone Statute, supra note 21 at art 2(g). The Rome Statute also includes 
mention of enforced sterilization: Rome Statute, supra note 21 at arts 7(1)(g), 8(2)(b)(xxii), 
8(2)(e)(vi). 
42 Sandesh Sivakumaran, “Sexual Violence Against Men in Armed Conflict” (2007) 18:2 
European Journal of International Law 253 at 256 [Sivakumaran, “Sexual Violence”]. 
43 Simić Trial Judgment, supra note 15 at para 697.  
44 Ibid, at para 698. 
45 Ibid, at 198. 
46 Ibid, at para 771. 
47 Mucić et al Trial Judgment, supra note 19 at para 1037. 
48 Ibid, at 1039. 
49 Ibid, at paras. 1035, 1037, 1038, 1039. 
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forced rape (including forced penetration by a broom handle) and other 
sexual acts between two pairs of fathers and sons and one pair of cousins; 
and penile amputation (then forcing other prisoners to ingest the penis).50 
Some of these acts were referred to directly as “sexual violence”51 while 
others were not. All were considered under charges of torture (as a crime 
against humanity and a war crime), cruel treatment (as a war crime) and 
inhumane treatment (as a crime against humanity) and as constituent aspects 
of persecution.52 In the ICTR’s case of Niyitegeka, the accused was convicted 
of aiding and abetting an incident in which a man’s genitals were amputated 
and displayed in the context of his murder, and this was characterized as an 
inhumane act of sexual violence.53 In the ICTY case of Stakić, the accused was 
found guilty of the crime against humanity of persecution based on – and 
characterized as - sexual assault on male detainees.54 Similarly, in Todorovic, 
genital beatings and ordering a detainee to bite another detainee’s penis 
were considered by the ICTY to be sexual assaults and therefore underlying 
acts of persecution.55  
Finally, international criminal courts and tribunals appear unsure how to 
address secondary victimization as a result of sexual violence: is it a form of 
sexual violence in and of itself, or is it mainly something else, such as a form 
of psychological torture?56 For example, in the ICTY’s Furundžija case, a 
woman was raped and sexually assaulted and her male friend was forced to 
watch “in order to force him to admit allegations made against her”.57 The 
Tribunal concluded that both witnesses were “subjected to severe physical 
and mental suffering”, and therefore torture.58 The Trial Chamber in Stanišić 
and Župljanin also considered the harm inherent in forcing a man to watch a 
female relative being raped, similarly considering this as evidence of torture, 
inhumane acts and persecution.59 The Special Court for Sierra Leone 
recognized the harm caused by RUF fighters forcing a man to watch the rape 
and death of his wife, and considered this an aspect of fomenting terror by 
sexual means.60 To arrive at a consistent international criminal legal 
approach, deeper consideration of this form of victimization is needed. 
                                                
50 Prosecutor v Mićo Stanišić and Stojan Župljanin, IT-08-91-T (Vol I) (27 March 2013) at paras 1221, 
1235, 1599, 1663 (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber II) 
[Stanišić and Župljanin Trial Judgment]. 
51 Ibid, at para 1560. 
52 Ibid, at paras 1221, 1235, 1246, 1248-1250, 1560, 1685, 1687-1690. 
53 Prosecutor v Eliezer Niyitegeka, ICTR-96-14-T, Judgment and Sentence (16 May 2003) paras 462-
467, 303, 312, 462 (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Trial Chamber I) [Niyitegeka Trial 
Judgment]. 
54 Prosecutor v Milomir Stakić, IT-97-24-T, Judgment (31 July 2003) paras. 228, 236, 241, 617 
(International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber II). See also 
Sivakumaran, “Lost in Translation”, supra note 20 at 275.  
55 Todorovic Sentencing Judgment, supra note 27 at para 38. 
56 For a discussion of this, see R Charli Carpenter, “Recognizing Gender-Based Violence Against 
Civilian Men and Boys in Conflict Situations” (2006) 37:1 Security Dialogue, 83 at 96-97. 
57 Prosecutor v Anto Furundžija, IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment (10 December 1998) para 127 
(International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber). See also para 267 
for a description of the effect of forced viewing of sexual violence. 
58 Ibid, at 129, 267. 
59 Stanišić and Župljanin Trial Judgment, supra note 50 at para 1214. 
60 RUF Trial Judgment, supra note 35 at para 1347. 
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The recognition by international courts and tribunals of various forms of 
sexual violence directed against men and boys is important and helps shed 
light on generally overlooked forms of sexual violence, including similar 
violence directed against women and girls. Yet, the incoherent approach 
taken by and within various tribunals raises serious concerns. Male sexual 
violence is not consistently and accurately being labeled as such. This 
obscures the sexual nature of the prohibited acts.61 It also perpetuates the 
inaccurate stereotype that sexual violence is a crime that only affects women 
and girls and overlooks male sexual violence.62 In comparison, violence 
directed against women and girls is more likely to be directly categorized as 
sexual - sometimes there is an intense focus on the sexual aspects, to the 
detriment of including or recognizing other forms of female victimization.63 
Campbell notes that the ICTY’s Prosecutor has been more likely to charge 
rape of female victims than of male victims; as a result, there is a pattern 
where “men appear to testify to conflict and women testify to rape”.64 The 
treatment of male sexual violence sometimes as sexual violence, and 
sometimes simply as violence, creates ambiguity and undermines the 
potential for positive expressivism in international criminal law.65 Clear 
prosecutorial policy on how to address male sexual violence is needed. This 
policy needs to not only address how to bring consistency to the 
prosecutorial approach, but also how to address the factual, social and legal 
gaps outlined in the following sections. 
III. International Criminal Law and the Factual Gap on 
Sexual Violence Directed Against Men and Boys 
As awareness slowly builds that men and boys are also victims of sexual 
violence in armed conflicts and other forms of mass atrocity, more reports 
are recording incidents of this type of violence.66 These reports are helpful, 
                                                
61 Jarvis and Salgado note that “sexual violence” is the best term, as it highlights that these 
crimes are less about sex and more about violence and control: Michelle Jarvis and Elena Martin 
Salgado, “Future Challenges to Prosecuting Sexual Violence Under International Law: Insights 
from ICTY Practice” in Anne-Marie de Brouwer et al, eds, Sexual Violence as an International 
Crime: Interdisciplinary Approaches (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2013) 103. 
62 Sivakumaran, “Lost in Translation”, supra note 20 at 273. See also Sivakumaran, 
“Prosecuting”, supra note 1 at 93. It is important to note that sexual violence directed against 
women and girls is also not attended to with regularity, and thus the comparison is between 
instances when female sexual violence is, in fact, identified in comparison with instances when 
male sexual violence is identified. 
63 Franke describes this as the reduction of gendered harms to the sexual: Katherine M Franke, 
“Gendered Subjects of Transitional Justice” (2006) 15 Columbia Journal of Gender and Law 813 
at 822-823. See also Fionnuala Ní Aoláin et al, On the Frontlines: Gender, War, and the Post-Conflict 
Process (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011) at 45-46; and Dara Kay Cohen et al, Wartime 
Sexual Violence: Misconceptions, Implications, and Ways Forward (Washington DC, United States 
Institute of Peace, February 2013) at 7-8, online: USIP <http://www.usip.org/sites/default/ 
files/resources/SR323.pdf>. 
64 Campbell, supra note 14 at 425. 
65 On expressivism in international criminal law, see Margaret M. deGuzman, “An Expressive 
Rationale for the Thematic Prosecution of Sex Crimes” in Morten Bergsmo, Thematic Prosecution 
of International Sex Crimes (Beijing: Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, 2012) 11-44. 
66 E.g. Syria Commission of Inquiry Report, supra note 2 above; Libya Commission of Inquiry 
Report, supra note 6 above; Sivakumaran, “Sexual Violence”, supra note 42 above at 257-260 and 
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but they tend to be anecdotal. Where there happen to be multiple reports, 
“male sexual violence has been recognized as regular and unexceptional, 
pervasive and widespread”.67 That said, it is relatively rare for the incidence 
of male sexual violence during conflict or other situations of mass atrocity to 
be studied in particular conflicts, let alone across conflicts.68 For example, 
Sivakumaran outlines only two prevalence studies, from Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Liberia,69and Cohen et al. point to only two studies on 
wartime sexual violence against men in which the surveyors asked about the 
sex of the perpetrator and the sex of the victim – one from Sierra Leone and 
one from the Democratic Republic of the Congo.70 This dearth of systematic 
data on male victimization is problematic: it “demonstrates that pervasive 
gendered expectations about women’s and men’s roles [with women as the 
only victims and men solely as perpetrators] during wartime prevent 
researchers and policymakers alike from robustly analyzing questions of 
wartime sexual violence.”71 More specific to the theme of this article, lack of 
survey data on particular armed conflicts also hampers international 
prosecutors and victims’ counsel from presenting non-victim/witness-
provided evidence of male sexual violence – evidence that could be helpful 
in explaining the occurrence, the context and the pattern of the crimes to the 
judges.72 Thus, more study is certainly needed,73 and may help to explain not 
only the forms and patterns of male sexual violence in specific conflicts, but 
also shed light on “the causes of sexual violence against men, and why men 
may be targeted in some contexts but not others.”74 That said, under-
reporting by victims due to fear, shame, stigma, confusion, guilt and loss of 
masculinity is likely to remain an issue, and this must be taken into 
account.75 
                                                
associated footnotes [noting at 259 that most studies come from medical literature and reports of 
nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations with presence in the field]; 
Sivukumaran, “Lost in Translation”, supra note 20 at 263-265 and associated footnotes; 
Sivukumaran, “Prosecuting”, supra note 1 at 80-82 and associated footnotes; Save the Children, 
Unspeakable Crimes Against Children: Sexual Violence in Conflict (2013) at 4, 8, online: Save the 
Children <http://www.savethechildren.ca/document.doc?id=332>; Sarah Solangon and Preeti 
Patel, “Sexual Violence Against Men in Countries Affected by Armed Conflict” (2012) 12:4 
Conflict, Security & Development 417-442, and reports cited in the references.; and Cohen et al, 
supra note 63 at 7-8. 
67 Sivakumaran, “Sexual Violence”, supra note 42 at 259. 
68 Sivakumaran notes that this may be because male sexual violence remains “a cause without a 
voice”, with “no natural constituency to advocate on their behalf”: Sivakumaran, “Prosecuting”, 
supra note 1 at 81-82. 
69 Sivakumaran, “Lost in Translation”, supra note 20 at 263.  
70 Cohen et al, supra note 63 at 7. 
71 Ibid. 
72 On how data can assist in establishing patterns and context, see Xabier Agirre Aranburu, 
“Sexual Violence Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Using Pattern Evidence and Analysis for 
International Cases” (2010) 23:3 Leiden Journal of International Law, 609 at 618-627. 
73 Sivakumaran, “Sexual Violence”, supra note 42 at 260; Sivakumaran, “Lost in Translation”, 
supra note 20 at 276. 
74 Cohen et al, supra note 63 at 7. For preliminary analysis on causes, see, e.g., Solangon and 
Patel, supra note 66 at 425-430. 
75 Solangon and Patel, supra note 66 at 422-423; Sivakumaran, “Sexual Violence”, supra note 42 at 
255; Sivakumaran, “Lost in Translation”, supra note 20 at 264; Sivakumaran, “Prosecuting”, supra 
note 1 at 81. 
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Despite this factual gap and the need for further and deeper analysis, 
two important lessons emerge. First, the reports available help set out a 
preliminary explanation of reasons and a typology of sexual violence against 
men and boys. They also show how the types of violence used vary from 
situation to situation. The reports seem to illustrate that sexual violence 
directed against men and boys is meant to achieve similar ends as sexual 
violence directed against women and girls:76 to assert domination, to 
terrorize,77 to coerce,78 to humiliate and degrade, to prevent procreation by 
the victims (of their ethnicity or culture), and to disempower.79 Indeed, 
sexual violence directed against men and boys is similarly rooted in the 
hegemonic masculinity of war.80 In addition, male sexual violence may be 
committed for different reasons than female sexual violence: specifically, “to 
cast aspersions of homosexuality” and to emasculate.81 Sivakumaran 
helpfully grouped accounts of male sexual violence under different 
headings: rape (by body parts or objects), including forced fellatio and forced 
rape between two victims (both male or male and female), and threat of 
rape;82 enforced sterilization and sexual mutilation, such as castration or 
penile amputation;83 genital violence, such as beatings or electrocution;84 
forced nudity, either as a prelude to rape or other forms of sexual violence or 
to sexually humiliate;85 forced masturbation;86 and sexual slavery.87 This 
typology assists in demonstrating that male sexual abuse is not only about 
rape: indeed, “insofar as men and boys are concerned, [rape] may not be the 
predominant form of sexual violence committed against them.”88 
Investigators, prosecutors, counsel (victims’ and defence) and judges need to 
be alert to potential differences between, and within, conflicts of types of 
sexual violence, as well as potential differences in the location of male and 
female sexual violence. Men and boys are most likely to experience sexual 
violence during conflict or atrocity while in detention, or as prisoners of war 
or members of armed forces or armed groups (including as boy soldiers).89 
                                                
76 Sivakumaran, “Prosecuting”, supra note 1 at 81. 
77 RUF Trial Judgment, supra note 35 at paras 1125, 1347-1351; Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 
37 at paras 2035-2038, 2053. 
78 See e.g. Syria Commission of Inquiry Report, supra note 2 at para 107 and Annex IX paras 5, 
11. 
79 Sivakumaran, “Prosecuting”, supra note 1 at 81; Sivakumaran, “Sexual Violence”, supra note 42 
at 267-275. 
80 On hegemonic masculinity, gender and conflict, see Carol Cohn, “Women and Wars: Toward 
a Conceptual Framework” in Carol Cohn, Women & Wars (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2013) 1, 
10-11.  
81 Sivakumaran, “Prosecuting”, supra note 1 at 81; Sivakumaran, “Sexual Violence”, supra note 42 
at 270-273. 
82 Sivakumaran, “Sexual Violence”, supra note 42 at 263-264. He also mentions “rape plus”, 
which is rape done specifically to transmit HIV/AIDS or which has a consequence of doing so: 
264. 
83 Ibid, at 265. See also description of the ICC’s Kenyatta case in Part 4, below. 
84 Sivakumaran, “Sexual Violence”, supra note 42 at 266. See also Syria Commission of Inquiry 
Report, supra note 2 at para 107 and Annex IX paras 5, 10-13. 
85 Sivakumaran, “Sexual Violence”, supra note 42 at 266. 
86 Ibid, at 266-267. 
87 Sivakumaran, “Prosecuting”, supra note 1 at 80. 
88 Ibid, at 94. 
89 Sivakumaran, “Lost in Translation”, supra note 20 at 271. Investigators and prosecutors need 
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The available information suggests a variation in extent and form of both 
female and male sexual violence, and therefore, not all types of sexual 
violence are applicable in all conflicts or situations of atrocity. It is not clear, 
however, why some forms of sexual violence occur more in some contexts 
than in others.90  
The second lesson that emerges from available reports is that male and 
female sexual violence are clearly interlinked.91 For example, in Syria, sexual 
violence is used as a tool against both male and female detainees to coerce 
male opposition fighters to turn themselves in.92 This conclusion is also 
reflected in international cases – the ICC’s Bemba example above showed 
how rape of a male head of household was interconnected with the rape of 
his two daughters, likely to enhance the expression of domination by the 
perpetrators over the entire household.93 In Sierra Leone, the jurisprudence 
demonstrated that the rebels intentionally used sexual violence against both 
males and females – simultaneously or in combination - to terrorize 
civilians.94 Sivakumaran argues that the connections between the two forms 
of sexual violence require that both types should be subjected to similar 
analytical rubrics because “the dynamics, the constructions of masculinity 
and femininity and the stereotypes involved are similar.”95 Thus, 
consideration of them together by international investigators, prosecutors 
and victims’ counsel may lead to a more nuanced consideration in the 
jurisprudence of the roles of men and women in armed conflict and 
“ignoring it may mean missing out on a vital component of the issue”96  
In sum, the lack of in-depth and prevalence reporting on male sexual 
violence in atrocity and conflict encumbers international criminal law’s 
understanding of this form of sexual violence: lack of reporting may lead 
international investigators to incorrectly overlook male sexual violence as a 
possible crime in the situation at hand. Therefore, more consistent reporting 
on the occurrence, forms, patterns and prevalence of male sexual violence 
could assist international investigators, prosecutors, victims’ and defence 
counsel, and judges, leading to increased legal recognition of these 
violations. The reports presently available for some conflicts assist 
                                                
to be aware that the types of witnesses chosen can influence the likelihood of demonstrating 
male sexual violence, especially in detention: Campbell notes the ICTY’s relatively positive 
record in prosecuting sexual violence directed against male victims is “in clear contrast to the 
general lack of visibility of male sexual assault in the Yugoslavian conflict; both in terms of 
media coverage and in comparison to the institutional and legal focus upon sexual violence 
against women”: Campbell, supra note 14 at 423. She says the disproportionate number of male 
witnesses appearing before the Tribunal might explain this: ibid, at 424. 
90 Sivakumaran, “Lost in Translation”, supra note 20 at 263; Elisabeth Wood, “Variation in Sexual 
Violence During War” (2006) 34:3 Politics & Society 307-341. 
91 E.g. Maria Eriksson Baaz and Maria Stern, The Complexity of Violence: A Critical Analysis of 
Sexual Violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Sweden: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet and Sida, 
2010) 7-14, 41-50, online: NAI <http://nai.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2:319527>. 
92 Syria Commission of Inquiry Report, supra note 2 at para 107 and Annex IX paras 5, 11. 
93 Bemba Confirmation of Charges, supra note 23 above, paras 171-172. 
94 RUF Trial Judgment, supra note 35 at paras 1125, 1347-1351; Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 
37 at paras 2035-2038, 2053. 
95 Sivakumaran, “Sexual Violence”, supra note 42 at 260. Not all agree: see Carpenter, supra note 
56 at 94.  
96 Sivakumaran, “Sexual Violence”, supra note 42 at 260. 
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international investigators and lawyers in understanding the typology of 
male sexual violence, and the linkages between male and female sexual 
violence, but the understanding of these is still rudimentary.  
IV. International Criminal Law and the Social Gap on Sexual 
Violence Directed Against Men and Boys 
The gap in reporting on, and therefore deep analysis of, male sexual 
violence is compounded by what may be referred to as a ‘social’ gap. There 
are two aspects to that gap: the difficulties that exist for men and boys to 
understand and report their sexual victimization, and the challenges others 
(including investigators, prosecutors, victims’ and defence counsel, and 
judges) may have in recognizing male sexual violence.  
It is suspected that male victims of sexual violence significantly under-
report their victimization “due to a combination of shame, confusion, guilt, 
fear and stigma”.97 They may feel unable to reveal their mistreatment 
because they feel overwhelmed by the other aspects of their life due to 
displacement, insecurity and chaotic state systems, or because there is simply 
no place or institution (whether medical, legal or otherwise) to which to 
report.98 Masculine gender norms of aggression and protection tend to be 
exaggerated or heightened during times of conflict or atrocity.99 Thus, male 
victims of sexual violence may feel even more reluctant to report sexual 
violence than they do during peacetime, as they may feel like they have 
failed to accord with those cultural norms of manhood (both in being 
attacked and in being able to cope ‘like a man’).100 As well, men and boys 
may feel unable to reveal their emotions due to these same cultural gender 
norms.101 Even if they do feel able to reveal their victimization, they may not 
be able to express themselves adequately if their culture lacks phrases to 
describe male sexual violence.102 They may not view their victimization as 
sexual in nature, either because they have adopted a societal assumption that 
males cannot be raped (or be the victim of sexual abuse),103 or because the 
sexual violence was accompanied by many other kinds of violence and thus 
may be considered as one of a number of forms of beating or torture.104 All of 
these difficulties deserve consideration in formulating overarching 
prosecutorial policy toward male sexual violence, and in approaching 
investigation and prosecution of male sexual violence in particular cases. 
The second aspect of the social gap is that investigators, prosecutors, 
victims’ and defence counsel, and judges may face challenges in recognizing 
male sexual violence. First, those on the ground — such as investigators and 
                                                
97 Sandesh Sivakumaran, “Male/Male Rape and the “Taint” of Homosexuality” (2005) 27 
Human Rights Quarterly 1274 at 1288; Sivakumaran, “Sexual Violence”, supra note 42 at 255. 
98 Solangon and Patel, supra note 66 at 424. 
99 Ní Aoláin et al, supra note 63 at 49-55. 
100 Sivakumaran, “Sexual Violence”, supra note 42 at 255. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid, at 255-256. Indeed, we have seen this with female sexual violence, where many cultures 
use euphemisms to describe rape: e.g. Akayesu Trial Judgment, supra note 22 at paras 152-154. 
103 This may be because the domestic law does not recognize male sexual abuse, especially rape, 
as such: see examples in Sivakumaran, “Prosecuting”, supra note 1 at 82-83. 
104 Sivakumaran, “Sexual Violence”, supra note 42 at 256.  
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those individuals the investigators speak to, like medical and humanitarian 
personnel — may assume men are not as susceptible to sexual violence, and 
therefore may pay less attention to detecting signs of this violence than they 
would when speaking with women and girls.105 Second, these individuals 
may not be trained to recognize signs of male sexual violence, or may 
incorrectly assume that only rape qualifies as sexual violence.106 Third, if the 
violence is recognized (for example, castration), then it may not be seen as 
sexual in nature, but rather simply as mutilation or torture, thereby 
reinforcing the view that only women and girls may be the victims of sexual 
violence.107 This gap is seen in an example related to the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone. As mentioned earlier, when the Prosecutor drafted the 
indictments containing sexual violence charges, all of these charges were cast 
as occurring only to women and girls: an assumption disproven by evidence 
arising during the AFRC, RUF and Taylor trials.108 Finally, female sexual 
violence (especially rape) is sometimes incorrectly understood as acts that 
are personal in nature and separate from the main activity of war.109 It may 
be that this same assumption is being applied to male sexual violence, 
depending on the scenario. Therefore, there is a risk that investigators, 
prosecutors, victims’ and defence counsel, and judges may be more likely to 
(incorrectly) conclude that sexual violence crimes are ‘opportunistic’ and 
disconnected from the prevailing context than they are to reach the same 
conclusions for other violent crimes.110 
International criminal tribunals alone cannot fix the factual gap or the 
social gap. However, international investigators, prosecutors and counsel 
need to be aware of these gaps and adopt strategies such as: encouraging and 
supporting the reporting and study of male sexual violence; training staff to 
overcome ingrained social and cultural assumptions about male sexual 
violence and to gain knowledge of, and experience in, detecting such 
violence;111 working to reduce retraumatization of male sexual violence 
victims in interviews;112 and ensuring that male sexual violence survivors are 
able to access psycho-social and other supports.113 These changes would 
undoubtedly serve to fill the legal gaps outlined in the next section. 
V. International Criminal Law and Legal Gaps on Sexual 
Violence Directed Against Men and Boys 
There are two types of legal gaps within international criminal law that 
hamper a clearer understanding of sexual violence directed against men and 
boys during conflict and times of other atrocity. The first gap is one of overt 
legal recognition for certain forms of sexual violence commonly directed 
                                                
105 Sivakumaran, “Sexual Violence”, supra note 42 at 256.  
106 Ibid. 
107 Ibid. See also the Kenyatta case on forced circumcision, described in Part 4, below. 
108 See notes 36-38 and accompanying text, supra. 
109 Jarvis and Salgado, supra note 61 at 102. 
110 Ibid, at 122. 
111 Sivakumaran, “Prosecuting”, supra note 1 at 92. 
112 Ibid, at 90. 
113 Ibid, at 87, 91. 
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against men and boys. On the one hand, there is recognition within 
international criminal law that anyone may be raped. The act of rape, 
whether as a crime against humanity or a war crime, has been defined in a 
neutral manner to capture rape committed against women, girls, men and 
boys. For example, one of the most widely-used definitions of rape in the 
ICTY and ICTR is: “the sexual penetration, however slight: (a) of the vagina 
or anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator or any other object used 
by the perpetrator; or (b) of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the 
perpetrator; where such sexual penetration occurs without the consent of the 
victim.”114 Other definitions are similarly inclusive.115 On the other hand, 
other modes of sexual violence commonly directed against men and boys – 
such as forced circumcision, penile amputation, castration, sexual mutilation 
(for example, burning of the genitals) and genital electrocution – are not 
explicitly listed in any international criminal statute or treaty.116 It is 
understandable that every specific form of sexual violence cannot be listed, 
which is why the residual category of other forms of sexual violence was 
included in the Rome Statute. However, this lack of overt recognition has 
meant that prosecutors and judges have sometimes entirely overlooked these 
forms of violence (as illustrated in the Special Court for Sierra Leone’s RUF 
and Taylor cases, discussed above),117 have classified the acts as something 
other than sexual violence,118 or where they have recognized the violence as 
sexual, their attempts at classification as sexual violence have been 
rebuffed.119  
The second gap in international criminal law is related: while the term 
‘sexual violence’ has been defined by international criminal tribunals, the 
word ‘sexual’ – obviously integral to the definition – is not well understood, 
resulting in misunderstandings. The term ‘sexual violence’ was first defined 
by the ICTR and later confirmed by the ICTY as: 
any act of a sexual nature which is committed on a person under 
circumstances which are coercive. Sexual violence is not limited to physical 
invasion of the human body and may include acts which do not involve 
penetration or even physical contact.120 
However, the term ‘sexual’ was not defined, and this is also the case in 
the ICC’s Elements of Crimes document.121 In order to articulate what type of 
                                                
114 Kunarac et al Trial Judgment, supra note 22 at para 460. 
115 See supra note 22. 
116 The Rome Statute of the ICC contains the most comprehensive listing of sexual violence 
crimes, and it includes as crimes against humanity and war crimes: “Rape, sexual slavery, 
enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, and any other form of sexual 
violence” comparable in nature: Rome Statute, supra note 21 at arts 7(1)(g), 8(2)(b)(xxii), 
8(2)(e)(vi).  
117 See notes 36-38 and accompanying text, supra. 
118 Sivakumaran, “Prosecuting”, supra note 1 at 92-95; Sivakumaran, “Lost in Translation”, supra 
note 20 at 273. 
119 This happened in the ICC’s Kenyatta case, which is explored in detail in Part 4, below. 
120 Akayesu Trial Judgment, supra note 22 at para 688; upheld in Prosecutor v Miroslav Kvočka et al, 
IT-98-30/1-T, Judgment (2 November 2001) at para 180 (International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber) [Kvočka et al Trial Judgment]. 
121 ICC “Elements of Crimes”, supra note 11 at art 7(1)(g)-6. 
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violence qualifies as sexual, the ICTY and ICTR have provided examples, 
such as forced public nudity,122 sexual mutilation,123 and forced abortion.124  
 
Perhaps the most detailed definition of sexual violence in the 
international criminal legal sphere – and therefore the definition closest to 
indicating the meaning(s) of ‘sexual’ – is that of the UN Special Rapporteur 
on systematic rape, sexual slavery and slavery-like practices: “any violence, 
physical or psychological, carried out through sexual means or by targeting 
sexuality”.125 This includes “both physical and psychological attacks directed 
against a person’s sexual characteristics, such as forcing a person to strip 
naked in public, mutilating a person’s genitals, or slicing off a woman’s 
breasts” and “situations in which two victims are forced to perform sexual 
acts on one another or to harm each other in a sexual manner”.126 While the 
Special Rapporteur’s definition does not directly define ‘sexual’, it is helpful 
in capturing the meaning(s) of ‘sexual’.127 She identifies three ways in which 
physical or psychological violence may be deemed to be sexual: first, by 
targeting a victim’s sexual characteristics such as body parts128 (like breasts, 
vaginas, testicles or penises); second, when the perpetrator uses sexual 
means to carry out the violence129 (such as humiliating an individual by 
placing the perpetrator’s penis in the victim’s mouth, or forcing two victims 
to perform sexual acts); or third, by targeting sexuality130 (a victim’s virginity, 
or virility, for example). This nuanced explanation of sexual violence 
indicates that what is ‘sexual’ must also be similarly nuanced. In other 
words, sexual violence is not about sex per se, but it is about body parts and 
socially-constructed norms of what is ‘sexual’ (for example, social norms that 
link the virginity of unmarried girls and women with a family’s honour).131 It 
would be helpful for international courts and tribunals to consider more 
comprehensively what makes certain kinds of violence sexual, in order to 
capture the relevant physical, sociological and psychological aspects. 
An example of how both gaps – in overt recognition and in 
                                                
122 Akayesu Trial Judgment, supra note 22 at para 697; Kvočka et al Trial Judgment, supra note 120 
at para 180. 
123 Niyitegeka Trial Judgment, supra note 53 at paras 456-467; Kvočka et al Trial Judgment, supra 
note 120 at para 180 and note 343. See also, for an example of sexual mutilation not overtly 
identified as such: Prosecutor v Duško Tadić, IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment (7 May 1997) at 
paras 729-730 (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber). 
124 Kvočka et al Trial Judgment, supra note 120 at para 180 and note 343. 
125 UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Systematic rape, 
sexual slavery and slavery-like practices pursued during armed conflict: Final report submitted by Gay J. 
McDougall, Special Rapporteur, 22 June 1998, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/13 (1998) at para 21 
[Report of the Special Rapporteur on Systematic Rape]. 
126 Ibid, at paras 21-22. 
127 There is more than one meaning to the word. E.g., Oxford Dictionaries defines the term as 
“relating to the instincts, physiological processes, and activities connected with physical 
attraction or intimate physical contact between individuals” or “relating to the two sexes or to 
gender”: Oxford University Press, Oxford Dictionaries, online: Oxford Dictionaries 
<http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/sexual?q=sexual>. 
128 Report of the Special Rapporteur on Systematic Rape, supra note 125 at para 21. 
129 Ibid, at paras 21-22. 
130 Ibid, at para 21.  
131 On sexual stereotypes, see Cook and Cusack, supra note 13 at 27-28. 
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understanding the sexual aspect of sexual violence – can unfortunately 
reinforce each other, thereby leading to the non-recognition of the sexual 
aspect of male-targeted sexual violence, occurred in an ICC case related to 
the post-election violence in Kenya in late 2007 and early 2008. In the 
Kenyatta case, the Prosecutor sought to charge the crime against humanity of 
‘other forms of sexual violence’132 in relation to the forced circumcision of 
Luo men.133 Pre-Trial Chamber II, in considering which charges would be 
included in the Summons to Appear, rejected the Prosecutor’s categorization. 
It found “the acts of forcible circumcision cannot be considered acts of a 
“sexual nature” as required by the Elements of Crimes” and are “more 
properly” listed under the crime against humanity of ‘other inhumane 
acts’.134 The Pre-Trial Chamber reached this conclusion “in light of the 
serious injury to body that the forcible circumcision causes and in view of its 
character, similar to other underlying acts constituting crimes against 
humanity.”135 While this explanation is somewhat unclear, it appears the Pre-
Trial Chamber felt that forcible circumcision was not ‘sexual’ enough to 
qualify as a form of sexual violence, and that the violence done to the men 
was more analogous to a physical injury on any other part of the body.  
The Prosecutor disagreed with this recategorization and, at the next 
stage confirming the charges, tried to explain why ‘other forms of sexual 
violence’ was a more appropriate category than ‘other inhumane acts’. First, 
the prosecution tried to broaden the Pre-Trial Chamber’s understanding of 
how men and boys136 were targeted for various forms of sexual violence, 
pointing out that they not only suffered forced circumcision and penile 
amputation, they also suffered rape,137 forced nudity and/or sexual 
mutilation.138 In other words, the overarching context of the forced 
circumcision and penile amputation was one where other forms of sexual 
violence also occurred. The Prosecutor also explained that other forms of 
violence, such as murder, accompanied these forms of sexual violence.139 
Unfortunately, this wider understanding of the context of male sexual 
violence may have been lost, as the Pre-Trial Chamber seemed to focus its 
                                                
132 The Rome Statute contains this list of prohibited acts within the crimes against humanity 
provision: “Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, 
or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity”: Rome Statute, supra note 21 at art 
7(1)(g). 
133 Prosecutor v Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali, ICC-
01/09-02/11, Decision on Prosecutor’s Application for Summonses to Appear for Francis Kirimi 
Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali (8 March 2011) at para 27 
(International Criminal Court, Pre-Trial Chamber II) [Kenyatta Summons to Appear].  
134 Ibid. 
135 Ibid. 
136 There was direct evidence on the targeting of boys: On 21 January 2008, eight Luo men had 
their genitals chopped off and even young boys, some of them as young as 11 and 5 years old 
had their genitalia cut with blunt objects such as broken glass. Prosecutor v Francis Kirimi 
Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali , ICC-01/09-02/11-T-5-Red-ENG 
CT WT 22-09-2011 1/108 NB PT, Transcript (22 September 2011) at 89, lines 21-23 (International 
Criminal Court, Pre-Trial Chamber II) [September 2011 Transcript]. 
137 Ibid, at 87, lines 5-12. 
138 Ibid, at 88, lines 9-12; 89, line 3; 91, lines 15-20. 
139 Ibid, at 90, lines 7-9. 
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Confirmation of Charges analysis of rape on female victims,140 and its 
analysis of male victims on forced circumcision and penile amputation (but 
not sexual mutilation or forced nudity).141 Second, the prosecution tried to 
explain why these acts should be viewed as a form of sexual violence, rather 
than obscured under the heading of inhumane acts.142 The prosecution 
explained how the sexuality of the Luo men was targeted by attempting to 
target their virility: “these weren’t just attacks on men’s sexual organs as 
such but were intended as attacks on men’s identities as men within their 
society and were designed to destroy their masculinity”.143 In other words, 
the prosecution attempted to engage the third prong of the Special 
Rapporteur’s definition. That said, the prosecution’s explanation was not as 
fulsome as it could have been, jumping from sexual organs to gender 
without stopping in the middle to make the link to sexual norms. The acts 
were sexual in nature not only because a sexual organ was targeted, but also 
because of the sexualized cultural norms attached to circumcision or non-
circumcision of the organ. Luo men and boys were targeted for forced 
circumcision and other acts for complex reasons, including to humiliate their 
sexual status within their own society.  
The response of the Pre-Trial Chamber indicated that it understood the 
Prosecutor’s argument to be that an act of violence is ‘sexual’ if it targets a 
‘sexual’ body part and it rejected this approach: “not every act of violence 
which targets parts of the body associated with sexuality should be 
considered an act of sexual violence.”144 The Pre-Trial Chamber ascribed a 
different meaning to the attacks than that proposed by the Prosecutor – “it 
appears from the evidence that the acts were motivated by ethnic prejudice 
and intended to demonstrate cultural superiority of one tribe over the 
other”145 – but without considering whether multiple motivations, including 
a motivation relating to humiliation of sexual status, can be considered. Both 
the explanations of the Prosecutor and the Pre-Trial Chamber are likely 
correct146 because both describe the purpose of the acts. However, the Pre-
Trial Chamber’s approach overlooked the specific role norms around 
circumcision (as a trigger for sexual and cultural manhood) played within 
                                                
140 This is not altogether clear, but the two detailed descriptions provided in the Confirmation of 
Charges decision relate to women: Prosecutor v Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta 
and Mohammed Hussein Ali, ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant 
to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute (23 January 2012) at paras 258-259 (International 
Criminal Court, Pre-Trial Chamber II) [Kenyatta Confirmation of Charges Decision]. 
141 Ibid, at paras 260-266. Para 261 mentions forced removal of clothes, but the PTC does not 
classify this evidence as a form of sexual violence, seemingly seeing it as part of the forcible 
circumcision act.  
142 September 2011 Transcript, supra note 136 at 88, lines 1-3: “The Prosecution submits that other 
forms of sexual violence are different from other inhumane acts due to the sexual nature of the 
specific acts.” 
143 Ibid, at 88, lines 12-15. 
144 Kenyatta Confirmation of Charges Decision, supra note 140 at para 265. 
145 Ibid, at para 266. 
146 See, e.g. September 2011 Transcript, supra note 136 at 91, 1-2: “witness assessed that the act of 
forcible circumcision was viewed as a punishment for having supported the Orange Democratic 
Movement, ODM.” See also: ibid, at 93, lines 3-6: “Weeks before the election, there were rumours 
that if election violence broke out, Kikuyus will circumcise Luo men. The suspects used this 
ethnic hatred, some already coloured in sexually violent terms, to carry out their common plan.” 
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the political and ethnic context of the acts.147 The Pre-Trial Chamber also 
offered no explanation as to when the Special Rapporteur’s first category of 
sexual violence – targeting a victim’s sexual characteristics such as body 
parts – would not apply. The Pre-Trial Chamber thus recategorized forced 
circumcision and penile amputation under the crime against humanity of 
‘other inhumane acts’, thereby prioritizing evidence of physical injury and 
motives related to ethnic prejudice while ignoring the evidence relating the 
perpetrators’ use of cultural norms of sexuality to dominate Luo males.148 
The lack of signalling in the Rome Statute that forced circumcision and 
penile amputations may be considered as sexual violence, combined with an 
under-articulated argument by the Prosecutor as to why exactly the acts 
qualified as ‘sexual’, led to a poor result: an under-reasoned decision by the 
judges on why exactly the acts did not qualify as ‘sexual’ (essentially leaving 
the categorization to ‘I know it when I see it’).149 
These gaps in overt codification and in categorization are heightened 
when international prosecutors and criminal tribunals fail to understand the 
interconnected nature of sexual violence. As discussed in Part 2 above, 
sexual violence directed against men and boys is often closely related to 
sexual violence directed against women and girls, regardless of whether it is 
committed by an ‘enemy’ or one’s own ‘side’. However, male-directed sexual 
violence has sometimes been perceived as different, and therefore separate, 
from sexual violence directed against women and girls. In the ICC’s Kenyatta 
case, the prosecution attempted to demonstrate that these forms of violence 
were intertwined:  
In committing rape and mutilation of genital organs, individuals are 
assaulted and wounded in ways that are socially gendered, in their identities 
as women and men as such, and in the social roles that they occupy, identify 
with, and anticipate filling as gendered members of their communities. 
Women who were gang raped were violated, humiliated, desecrated so as to 
lower their status and deprive them of their dignity and equality as human 
beings and, for some of them, to reduce their value as wives or potential 
wives. Men who were castrated were deprived of their manhood and 
debased in front of their families.150 
However, the Pre-Trial Chamber separated its consideration of forced 
circumcision and penile amputation from that of rape, exclusively focused 
on rape of females, and did not address forced nudity and sexual 
mutilation.151 Therefore, the Pre-Trial Chamber missed the opportunity to 
                                                
147 This point was made by Brigid Inder, Executive Director of the nongovernmental 
organization Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice in: ‘Kenya: Plea to ICC over Forced Male 
Circumcision’, IRIN News, 25 April 2011, online: IRIN <http://www.irinnews.org/Report/ 
92564/KENYA-Plea-to-ICC-over-forced-male-circumcision>. See also Inder’s comments in: 
Robbie Corey-Boulet, “In Kenya, Forced Male Circumcision and a Struggle for Justice” (The 
Atlantic, 1 August 2011), online: Atlantic <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/ 
2011/08/in-kenya-forced-male-circumcision-and-a-struggle-for-justice/242757/>. 
148 Kenyatta Confirmation of Charges Decision, supra note 140 at paras 266, 270.  
149 The Pre-Trial Chamber indicated that “the determination of whether an act is of a sexual 
nature is inherently a question of fact” - ibid, at para. 265 - but did not discuss what that factual 
consideration would cover. 
150 September 2011 Transcript, supra note 136 at 84, lines 4-13. 
151 Kenyatta Confirmation of Charges Decision, supra note 140 at paras 257-266. The prosecution 
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examine how the integration of these forms of violence advanced the 
overarching crimes against humanity requirements.152  
The legal gaps can be filled. The gap in overt recognition can be rectified 
in two ways: first, the statutes of any future tribunal or court applying 
international criminal law should include examples of sexual violence 
typically targeted at men and boys in the list of sexual violence crimes, such 
as forced circumcision, penile amputation or forced castration.153 Second, 
prosecutors, investigators, and victims’ and defence counsel need to become 
more knowledgeable about what ‘sexual’ means and how this applies to acts 
done to men and boys. If implemented, the legal recognition and 
categorization of male sexual violence is likely to become more consistent, 
which should, in turn, positively influence the manner in which judges 
understand the cases. This will help international criminal law move beyond 
the current ‘I know it when I see it’ approach to identifying violence against 
men and boys as sexual.  
VI. Conclusion 
International criminal law is still at a very early stage in its 
understanding of sexual violence directed against men and boys during 
conflict and other forms of atrocity. This explains the inconsistent 
approaches to the issue between, and within, international criminal courts 
and tribunals that tend to obscure the sexual nature of the violence. 
However, the preliminary nature of international analysis of the issue also 
presents an ideal opportunity for the creation of informed prosecutorial 
policy to positively influence future prosecutions. While the mandates of the 
ICTY, ICTR and Special Court for Sierra Leone will soon be ending,154 the 
International Criminal Court is a permanent institution. The Prosecutor of 
the ICC, Fatou Bensouda, has announced that her office is preparing a 
‘gender justice’ policy paper.155 Once it is prepared, she intends to circulate 
                                                
characterized sexual violence against males and females as a “powerful form of destruction”: 
September 2011 Transcript, supra note 136 at 92, lines 23-24.  
152 The crimes against humanity threshold is “a widespread or systematic attack directed against 
any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack”: Rome Statute, supra note 21 at art 7(1).  
153 It would be ideal for the Rome Statute to be amended in this way, but this is unlikely to 
happen unless there is strong political will among States Parties. 
154 United Nations Security Council, UNSC Res 1966 (2010) requested the ICTY and ICTR to 
“take all possible measures to expeditiously complete all their remaining work … no later than 
31 December 2014”: United Nations Security Council, ‘International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia’, UNSC Res 1966, UNSCOR 6463rd mtg, UN Doc S/Res/1966 (2010) at para 
3. The mandate of the Special Court for Sierra Leone will end after the completion of the 2013 
appeal in the Charles Taylor case: Special Court for Sierra Leone, Ninth Annual Report of the 
President of the Special Court for Sierra Leone June 2011 - May 2012 (2012) at 27, online: SCSL 
<http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=ZEDnSBp6ahc%3d&tabid=176>. 
155 Fatou Bensouda, Prosecutor-elect of the International Criminal Court, “Gender Justice and 
the ICC: Progress and Reflections”, at Justice for All? The International Criminal Court: 10 Year 
Review of the ICC (14 February 2012, Sydney, Australia) at 6, online: ICC <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/FED13DAF-3916-4E94-9028-123C4D9BB0C9/0/ 
StatementgenderSydeny140212.pdf>. This article was written in January 2013, and the 
discussion below reflects this timing. The Prosecutor issued her office's 'Policy Paper on Sexual 
and Gender-Based Crimes' in June 2014. This article therefore does not examine the impact of 
that policy paper on sexual violence directed against men and boys. 
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the draft paper to the international community for comment.156 This presents 
an excellent opportunity to ensure the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor 
embraces an educated approach to the scourge of male sexual violence. Such 
a policy could help create consistency in how the ICC’s Office of the 
Prosecutor understands, investigates, classifies, explains and charges male 
sexual violence. This consistency would, hopefully, lead to regular, 
thoughtful and more precise judicial analysis.157  
The ICC Prosecutor’s gender justice policy paper needs to grapple with 
the three gaps identified in this article. First, there are significant challenges 
in securing data explaining the forms, patterns and levels of incidence of 
male sexual violence in conflict or atrocity. This means prosecutors do not 
have information that would help to demonstrate that, for example, male 
sexual violence was part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against a civilian population.158 Thus, the ICC may wish to encourage 
academic, nongovernmental or intergovernmental organizations with 
experience in surveying to undertake such data collection in ICC situation 
countries. That said, reports that do exist are helpful in policy formation in 
that they demonstrate types of, and motivations behind, male sexual 
violence that may be helpful in training investigators and prosecutions, and 
in explaining male sexual violence to judges. In addition, these reports and 
tribunal jurisprudence to date demonstrate the interlinked nature of male 
and female sexual violence, which can again be used in training within the 
Office of the Prosecutor and in explaining the context of sexual violence in 
judicial briefs. 
The second gap – termed a social gap – must also inform the ICC 
Prosecutor’s gender justice policy paper. The policy must be aware of the 
barriers faced by men and boys that are disincentives to revealing their 
victimization. These barriers are similar to those faced by female victims of 
sexual violence – stigma, fear, shame, guilt, confusion and the need to focus 
on immediate survival priorities. However, there may be additional barriers 
that must be taken into account: the perceived need to live up to masculine 
gender norms heightened as a result of war, a lack of cultural expressions or 
terms to describe male sexual violence, or a perception that men and boys 
simply cannot be victims of sexual violence. Thus, sensitive investigation and 
prosecution practices are needed: these may mirror practices already in place 
at the ICC, or additions may be required to address male-specific needs.  
The second gap also requires sensitivity on the part of ICC staff and 
officials. Investigators and prosecutors need to be aware of any incorrect 
assumptions they, or individuals from whom they seek information (such as 
medical or humanitarian personnel), hold about male sexual violence. Such 
assumptions could include that rape is the only form of sexual violence, that 
men cannot be victims of sexual violence, or that sexual violence is ‘personal’ 
                                                
156 Ibid.  
157 There is a need for more precision in the judgments. For example, in the findings in Stanišić 
and Župljanin, the ICTY Trial Chamber found that male “[d]etainees were subjected to sexual 
humiliation” and sexual assault but provided no further details (and no footnote to witness 
evidence): Stanišić and Župljanin Trial Judgment, supra note 50 at paras 1221, 1235. 
158 This is the crimes against humanity threshold: Rome Statute, supra note 21 at art 7(1).  
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and not really connected to the main activity of war. The Office of the 
Prosecutor will need to ensure adequate training of all staff in recognizing 
and countering incorrect assumptions.  
The ICC’s Prosecutor is best equipped to fill the third gap. While the 
policy paper cannot change the crimes listed in the Rome Statute, and so 
cannot directly address the gap in overt recognition, the policy can promote 
consistent charging of male rape as such, and other forms of sexual violence 
directed against men and boys as ‘sexual violence’ or ‘enforced sterilization’, 
for example. It can also promote consistent explanation to the judges of how 
and why particular acts are sexual, and why it is important for those acts to 
be correctly labeled to capture the full nature of victimization. It can also 
tackle the issue of whether secondary victimization (such as forcing an 
individual to watch another individual being raped) is a form of sexual 
violence.   
The ICC Prosecutor’s policy paper can have a positive impact on 
domestic prosecutions of international crimes. As at the international level, 
there is also silence on male sexual violence at the domestic level.159 Thus, the 
ICC Prosecutor’s policy paper could help inform domestic investigators and 
prosecutors on best practices in this respect.160 
This article ends where it began, on the theme of the volume: sexual 
violence against men and boys, especially in detention, was recorded in 
recent conflicts in Libya and Syria. The ICC has the opportunity to prosecute 
this sexual violence (due to the referral of the situation in Libya to the ICC by 
the Security Council),161 thereby setting international precedent in drawing 
attention to this form of violence. In addition, it is important that evidence of 
male sexual violence continue to be gathered in the Syria situation, so that 
future prosecutions –whether by the ICC162 or domestic courts – are possible. 
Sexual violence against men and boys must no longer be “overlooked, 
downplayed, or re-characterized” within international criminal law.163 
In the meantime, social scientists, policy makers and advocates must 
increase their understanding of each other and how each approaches the 
collection and analysis of information. Mutual understanding can help 
strengthen efforts to stop, prevent or redress the violence, either through 
international prosecution or some other means. 
 
 
                                                
159 On limitations posed by domestic law, see Sivakumaran, “Prosecuting”, supra note 1 at 82-83. 
160 This is especially so because the Rome Statute is based on the principle of complementarity, 
under which, states have the primary responsibility to investigate and prosecute the crimes 
listed in the Rome Statute: Rome Statute, supra note 21 at art 17. 
161 United Nations Security Council, ‘Peace and Security in Africa’, UNSC Res 1970, UNSCOR 
6491st mtg, UN Doc S/Res/1970 (2011) at para 4. 
162 At the time of writing, the Security Council had not referred the situation in Syria to the ICC. 
Led by Switzerland, more than 50 countries wrote a letter to the Member States of the Security 
Council to call on the Council to refer the Syrian situation to the ICC. See letter of 14 January 
2013, available on the website of the Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the United Nations in 
New York, online: <http://www.eda.admin.ch/etc/medialib/downloads/edazen/topics/ 
intorg/un/missny/other.Par.0142.File.tmp/ICC-Brief%20def.pdf>. 
163 Sivakumaran, “Prosecuting”, supra note 1 at 79. 
